Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Really Prohibit Design Defect Claims?:  Examining Federal Preemption in Light of American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari by Guffrey, Tara
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 2 Winter 2009 Article 6
March 2012
Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act Really Prohibit Design Defect
Claims?: Examining Federal Preemption in Light of
American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari
Tara Guffrey
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tara Guffrey, Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Really Prohibit Design Defect Claims?: Examining Federal
Preemption in Light of American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/6
DOES THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE
INJURY COMPENSATION ACT REALLY PROHIBIT
DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS?: EXAMINING
FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OFAMERICAN
HOME PRODUCTS CORP. V. FERRARI
Tara Guffrey*
INTRODUCTION
By the time he reached eighteen months of age, Stefan Ferrari had
received many of his required childhood vaccines.' His parents recall
that he was a healthy child who displayed no difficulty
communicating verbally.2 Following his last set of booster shots,
however, Stefan stopped talking.3 Now ten years old, Stefan still has
not spoken.
4
Stefan's parents filed suit against the manufacturers of the various
vaccines he received, alleging their son suffered neurological damage
from thimerosal, a mercury-containing preservative in the vaccines.
5
Stefan's parents claim that the vaccines could have been made with a
safer, mercury-free preservative, or they could have been
manufactured in single-dose vials, which do not require a
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Bill Rankin, Allow Vaccine Suit, Parents Ask Justices; Federal Law a Roadblock: Lawyer for
Couple Says Boy Who Hasn't Spoken for Almost Nine Years Deserves Day in Court, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., May 21, 2008, at BI, available at 2008 WLNR 9552686.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), aft'd, 668 S.E.2d
236, 243 (Ga. 2008). For a discussion of the use of thimerosal in vaccines and its potential link to severe
side effects, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mercury and Vaccines (Thimerosal),
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/updates/thimerosal.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008). The CDC
maintains there is no scientific evidence of harm caused by the low doses of thimerosal in vaccines. Id.
Nevertheless, the CDC and other organizations recommended the removal of thimerosal from childhood
vaccines in 1999. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations Regarding the Use of
Vaccines That Contain Thimerosal As a Preservative, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 985,
996-98 (1999). With the exception of some influenza vaccines, thimerosal has not been used as a
preservative in routinely recommended childhood vaccines since 2001. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Mercury and Vaccines, supra.
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preservative. 6 In effect, the Ferraris argued the vaccines administered
to their son were defectively designed because safer reasonable
alternative designs were available.
7
The adverse effects allegedly suffered by Stefan as a result of
vaccination, though rare, are not unheard of.8 The use of vaccines
throughout the world has undoubtedly led to some of the greatest
advancements in public health-the eradication of small pox, the
elimination of major disease outbreaks, and the prevention of
thousands of deaths annually.9 Despite these successes, a small but
significant number of children suffer severe injuries each year as a
result of vaccination.'
0
What is quite unique about Stefan's case, however, is the treatment
it received in the Georgia appellate courts in 2007 and 2008. In 2005,
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the vaccine
manufacturers on the majority of the Ferraris' claims, including their
design defect claims." The Ferraris elected to appeal. 12 In July of
2007, the Georgia Court of Appeals announced its novel decision.
13
On appeal, the vaccine manufacturers argued the Ferraris' state law
design defect claims were preempted by the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the Vaccine Act or the Act), and pointed
to a series of holdings that support this position. 14 The Court of
6. Ferrari, 650 S.E.2d at 588.
7. See id. at 587.
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Breen, Note, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 309, 314-15 n.46 (1999-2000) (explaining that of the approximately
10,000 reports of adverse reactions received annually, less than fifteen percent describe serious events or
reactions); id at 314 (stating more than 100 million doses of vaccines are administered annually, yet in
1997, fewer than one hundred children died as a direct result of immunization).
9. Frank A. Sloan et al., The Fragility of the US. Vaccine Supply, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2443,
2443 (2004).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345 ("While
most of the Nation's children enjoy greater benefit from immunization programs, a small but significant
number have been gravely injured.").
11. Ferrari, 650 S.E.2d at 587.
12. Id. at 587.
13. See id. at 590 (reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
vaccine manufacturers on the plaintiffs' design defect claims and holding that the claims were not
preempted under federal law).
14. Id at 588; see also Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 302-03 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(holding plaintiffs' strict liability and negligent design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers were
expressly preempted under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986); Blacknon v. Am.
[Vol. 26:2
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Appeals, however, found the preemption clause at issue in the
Vaccine Act ambiguous, and in light of recent precedent from the
Supreme Court, held the Ferraris' design defect claims were not
preempted by federal law. 15 In so doing, the Georgia Court of
Appeals became the first court in the United States to interpret the
Vaccine Act to allow plaintiffs to bring design defect claims against
vaccine manufacturers under traditional tort law theories in state or
federal courts. 
16
The vaccine manufacturers immediately filed a petition for
certiorari, disputing the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals.
17
In October of 2008, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, albeit on different
grounds. 18 Conflicting with the holdings of other state and federal
courts throughout the country, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act does not preempt all
design defect claims against manufacturers. 19 As a result, the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision could open the door for design defect suits
against vaccine manufacturers by the parents of children who have
suffered adverse side effects from immunization.
20
By enacting the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,
Congress aimed to both ensure adequate and timely compensation for
those suffering from vaccine related injuries and discourage vaccine
Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding plaintiffs' negligent design
defect claims against several vaccine manufacturers were barred by the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 845-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding that
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 barred any design defect claims brought against
vaccine manufacturing defendants).
15. Ferrari, 650 S.E.2d at 590.
16. Alyson M. Palmer, High Court Hears Key Case on Vaccine Suits; Manufacturers Ask Georgia
Supreme Court to Overturn Lower Appeals Court Decision Finding Vaccine Suits Aren't Automatically
Pre-empted by Federal Law, DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), May 21, 2008, at 1.
17. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 2008).
18. See id. at 243 (holding that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act does not preempt all
design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers).
19. See R. Robin McDonald, Court Backs Vaccine Suit in Autism Case; Conflicting with Courts
Around the Country, Justices Say Congress Didn't Intend to "Pre-empt All Design Defect Claims",
DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Oct. 7, 2008, at 1.
20. Id. (noting that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision may allow the parents of children
suffering from autism to bring suits in Georgia alleging that the neurological effects are the result of
vaccination).
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manufacturers from leaving the market or raising prices by insulating
them from certain product liability claims. 21 This Note examines
whether, in light of recent decisions by the Georgia appellate courts,
the Vaccine Act preempts a lawsuit for design defect claims against a
vaccine manufacturer. Part I discusses the purposes of the Vaccine
Act, exploring the circumstances that brought about its enactment and
the subsequent case law that has come down in its wake. 22 Part II of
this Note analyzes the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, and specifically discusses
whether the Court's holding that design defect liability claims under
traditional tort law are not preempted by the Vaccine Act is supported
by the text of the Vaccine Act and its legislative history.23 Part III
suggests that the inherent ambiguity of the Vaccine Act's preemption
of design defect claims must be resolved in favor of vaccine
manufacturers by granting vaccines the status of "exceptional
products. 24 Finally, this Note concludes that Congress's initial goals
in passing the Vaccine Act are not met under the theory employed in
Ferrari, and that the purposes behind the Vaccine Act mandate that
design defect claims are preempted by federal law.
25
21. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348 ("[T]wo
overriding concerns have led to the development of this legislation: (a) the inadequacy-from both the
perspective of vaccine-injured persons as well as vaccine manufacturers-of the current approach to
compensating those who have been damaged by a vaccine; and (b) the instability and unpredictability of
the childhood vaccine market.").
22. See discussion infra Part 1.
23. See discussion infra Part H.
24. See discussion infra Part HI.
25. See discussion infra Part HI and Conclusion.
[Vol. 26:2
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I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Case Law Leading to American Home
Products Corp. v. Ferrari
1. American Immunization Precedent and Adoption of the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
For more than a century, mandatory immunization and vaccination
programs have existed in various forms throughout the United
States.26 Federal and state court decisions have consistently held it
within the police power of the states to require vaccination of
citizens, provided the laws are reasonable.2 7 Vaccination mandates
for children are particularly common, and courts have upheld them
even to the extent of denying unvaccinated children access to public
and private schools. 28 For most American children, vaccination is
routine.29
Widespread vaccination against common, yet deadly, childhood
infections and diseases has been described as "one of the most
spectacularly effective public health initiatives this country has ever
undertaken., 30  Vaccination prevents the death of thousands of
children each year, substantially reduces the effects resulting from
26. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905) (holding a compulsory state statute,
which mandated vaccination of all citizens against smallpox, a valid exercise of police power under the
Constitution); see also R. Alta Charo, Politics, Parents and Prophylaxis-Mandating HPV Vaccination
in the United States, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1905, 1905-06 (2007).
27. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (explaining the primary feature of compulsory vaccination laws which
generally imparts reasonableness is an exemption clause for those with medical or contraindications to
vaccination). Today, all fifty states offer some form of exemption as part of their vaccination programs.
James Colgrove, The Ethics and Politics of Compulsory HPV Vaccination, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2389,
2390 (2006). School immunization laws in every state grant exemptions for children with medical
contraindications to immunizations. Id. Additionally, forty-eight states allow religious exemptions for
people with sincere religious opposition to immunization. Id. A growing number of states, currently
twenty in total, also grant exemptions for parents who claim philosophical convictions against
immunization. Id.
28. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922) (finding a San Antonio city ordinance, which denied
admission to both public and private schools to unvaccinated children, a valid exercise of police power).
29. According to the CDC, by the age of five, when children must show proof of immunity to enroll
in public schools, the rate of vaccination compliance climbs to more than 95%. Pauline Self, Note, The
HPV Vaccination: Necessary or Evil?, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 161 (2008).
30. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,6345.
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disease-it even led to the eradication of small pox.3 1 In the early
1980s, however, the country's ability to continue supporting wide-
scale vaccination of children was in jeopardy. 32 Litigation by children
suffering injuries from vaccines increased dramatically, causing
vaccine manufacturers to raise prices significantly or leave the
market altogether. 33  This resulted in vaccine shortages and an
inability to ensure vaccine availability to all American children.
34
Congress sought to address this looming problem by enacting the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.35
The goal of the Vaccine Act was twofold: (1) ensure those
suffering injures as a result of vaccination receive compensation in a
manner that is more predictable, cost-efficient, and timely than the
traditional tort system, and (2) free manufacturers from the threat of
large, uncertain tort liability, and thereby encourage them to remain
in the market and keep prices low. 36 The Vaccine Act established the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
providing a unique avenue of recovery for those suffering injury or
31. Sloan et al., supra note 9, at 2443.
32. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4 (describing how previously unrecognized injuries associated with
vaccines were becoming widely known, leading injured parties to seek redress and financial relief from
the tort system in increasing numbers).
33. For example, in 1978, only one lawsuit was filed against manufacturers of the diphtheria,
tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine. In 1985, however, DTP vaccine manufacturers faced 219 lawsuits.
Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). Additionally, the costs
associated with defending these lawsuits and maintaining sufficient insurance was the primary factor in
the increased cost of vaccines. Id. The average price of the DTP vaccine in 1984 was eleven cents per
dose, whereas in 1986 the price of a dose was $11.40. Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 523 (N.J.
1989). Eight dollars in this price increase was attributed to the cost of insurance alone. Id. Insurance
costs were also a significant factor in the decrease in the number of manufacturers producing DTP,
which dropped from five in 1972 to two by 1984. Id.
34. See Randall B. Keiser, Dej6 Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 16 (1992) (explaining that increased costs and
decreased availability of vaccines caused levels of immunization to drop, resulting in a corresponding
increase in the incidence of disease in some areas of the U.S. during the early 1980s).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34 (2000). The Act is divided into two parts. Part I of the Act
establishes the National Vaccine Program, which is charged with overseeing federal vaccine-related
research, testing, licensing, production, and distribution, and improving the nation's immunization
programs. Id §§ 300aa-l to -6. Part II of the Act establishes the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, which includes the creation of a vaccine injury compensation trust fund and outlines the
procedures, requirements, and conditions under which injured parties may recover. Id. §§ 300aa-10 to -
34.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348.
[Vol. 26:2
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death as a result of vaccination.37  Under the Act's procedural
requirements, an injured individual seeking compensation must first
file a petition in the Court of Federal Claims.38 The petitioner does
not have the burden of proving fault or causation;39 he need only
show that he received a vaccine covered by the Act and then suffered
certain symptoms or side effects within a defined period of time to
make out a prima facie case for compensation. 40 Awards are drawn
from a fund financed by an excise tax on each vaccine dose.4'
The Vaccine Act prohibits an injured individual from filing a civil
action for damages before first filing a petition and seeking judgment
from the Court of Federal Claims.42 The petitioner may then either
accept the Federal Claims Court's judgment (and any award) and
abandon his tort rights,43 or reject the judgment and retain his tort
rights.44 If a plaintiff elects to reject the judgment of the Court of
Federal Claims, he may pursue his tort law claims in state or federal
court, subject to certain limitations spelled out in the Vaccine Act.45
In § 300aa-22(a) the Act specifically provides that once a claimant
opts out of the Court of Federal Claims process, "State law shall
apply to a civil action brought for damages for a vaccine-related
37. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10(a).
38. Section 300aa-I l(a)(2)(A) provides the following:
No person may bring a civil action for damages in an amount greater than $1,000 or in an
unspecified amount against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer in a State or Federal
court for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, and no such court may award damages
in an amount greater than $1,000 in a civil action for damages for such a vaccine-related
injury or death, unless a petition has been filed.., for compensation under the Program
for such injury or death.
39. Id. §§ 300aa-l I to -14; see also Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 270 (1995) (explaining
that a claimant is eligible for compensation by introducing proof of actual causation, but alternatively,
compensation can also be awarded if the claimant meets the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table
without proving causation).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I ito-14.
41. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 9510 (2006) (establishing procedures for maintenance of the fund).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll.
43. If the claimant elects to accept compensation and abandon his tort rights, the Act transfers these
rights to the federal government via subrogation. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-17.
44. Id.; see also §§ 300aa-i 1(a)(2)(A)(i), 300aa-21(b) (stating the claimant may reject the judgment
of the Court of Federal Claims and retain his tort rights; alternatively, the claimant may keep his tort
rights by withdrawing his petition if the Court moves too slowly or a decision is unreasonably delayed).
45. See id. § 300aa-21.
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injury or death.'A6 This statement, however, is followed by a caveat
in § 300aa-22(b): "No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil
action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death...
if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable
even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied
by proper directions and warnings. 'A7 In effect, this section of the
Vaccine Act places limits on a potential plaintiffs right to bring a
design defect claim against a vaccine manufacturer. 48  Congress
modeled subsection (b) specifically after comment k to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 49 Thus, it is clear the Vaccine
Act preempts state law to some extent, but still expressly reserves a
role for state courts.
50
2. Struggling to Apply the Vaccine Act: Interpretation of§ 300aa-
22(b)
Subsequent courts interpreting the Vaccine Act have struggled to
determine the extent to which traditional tort law remedies for design
defect claims are preempted by the language of § 300aa-22(b).5 1
Courts have declared that the limitation, on its face, is ambiguous.
52
46. See id. § 300aa-22(a).
47. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, § 300aa-22(b)(2) presumes that a vaccine is
accompanied by proper warnings and directions so long as the manufacturer complied with all
applicable requirements under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Finally, § 300aa-22(c) states
that no vaccine manufacturer will be held liable in a civil action for failing to provide direct warnings to
the injured party.
48. Keiser, supra note 34, at 30.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 25-26 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6366
(stating that § 300aa-22(b) sets forth the principle contained in comment k of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b); see also Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994)
("[The Act modifies, but does not eliminate, the traditional tort system, which Congress understood to
provide important incentives for the safe manufacture and distribution of vaccines.").
51. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting the two
alternative interpretations put forth by plaintiffs and defendant manufacturers); Sykes v. Glaxo-
SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 299 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding § 300aa-22(b) has two "plausible"
meanings and noting that the plain text of the Vaccine Act does not resolve the proper interpretation);
Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (discussing two
possible conflicting interpretations of § 300aa-22(b)); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d
236, 239 (Ga. 2008) (acknowledging that two alternative, plausible readings exist with regard to
preemption under § 300aa-22(b)); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003) (stating that on its face, the meaning of § 300aa-22(b) "is not entirely clear").
52. Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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In doing so, two plausible readings of the section have been
suggested.53 The first possible reading posits that any injury caused
by a vaccine covered under the Act is deemed "unavoidable" as a
matter of law, provided the vaccine was properly prepared and
accompanied by adequate warnings.54 This reading of the statute
essentially provides a complete bar to state tort suits premised on a
design defect theory. 55 Alternatively, the second possible reading of
the limitation posits that the section could be read as barring design
defect claims only where the side effects are determined, on a case-
by-case basis, to be unavoidable.56 This reading permits juries in
individual cases to determine whether a vaccine could have been
designed better so as to avoid the injury suffered.57
To resolve the ambiguity and decide which of the two
interpretations is accurate, courts have looked to Congress's
legislative intent in enacting the Vaccine Act.58 Most courts believe
the legislative history of the Act strongly supports a construction that
53. See, e.g., Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
54. See, e.g., Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 299 ("[D]efendants construe this section of the Vaccine Act
to impose a total bar on design defect claims arising from vaccine-related injuries so long as the vaccine
was produced in accordance with FDA-approved specifications.").
55. Not surprisingly, this is the interpretation advocated by vaccine manufacturers. See, e.g., Sykes,
484 F. Supp. 2d at 299; Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 663; Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 237; Militrano, 769
N.Y.S.2d at 843-44. This interpretation is attractive to manufacturers because it implies that Congress
entrusted the determination of whether a vaccine design is safe to the expertise of federal health
agencies, rather than juries. Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
56. See, e.g., Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 844 (explaining that determination on a case-by-case basis
would involve an inquiry into whether a covered vaccine could have been designed better so as to avoid
the injury being suffered by the claimant).
57. This, of course, is the interpretation argued for by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at
299; Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 663; Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 237; Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
This interpretation is asserted by plaintiffs because it allows a jury, rather than a federal agency, to
determine whether a particular side effect was unavoidable. Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 665. A
plaintiff can demonstrate the design defect was not unavoidable by showing that a reasonable alternative
design was feasible. Id.
58. See Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 299 ("1 will look at the legislative history of the Act and any other
relevant extrinsic material to decipher Congress's intent in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(l).");
Blackmaon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 664 ("The legislative history also supports a construction of § 300aa-22(b)
that would bar all defective design claims under the conditions outlined in the statute."); Militrano, 769
N.Y.S.2d at 844 ("Resolution of these competing interpretations requires a tripartite analysis of the
legislative history of the Act, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the case law that existed at the time
the Act was enacted."); see also Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court asserts that when interpreting an ambiguous statute, the Court has consistently
examined legislative history and other extrinsic material.
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would bar all defective design claims under state law. 59 For example,
they often point to a passage in the Report of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce that states the following:
Vaccine-injured persons will now have an appealing alternative
to the tort system. Accordingly, if they cannot demonstrate under
applicable law either that a vaccine was improperly prepared or
that it was accompanied by improper directions or inadequate
warnings [they] should pursue recompense in the compensation
system, not the tort system.
60
Thus, for several years, courts throughout the United States that
have decided the issue applied the first reading of the statute-that
injuries caused by covered vaccines are unavoidable as a matter of
law-and dismissed state tort law claims premised on design defect
theories as preempted by the Vaccine Act.
6 1
3. Everything Changes: The Georgia Appellate Courts Decide
Ferrari
In 2007, the Georgia Court of Appeals released its opinion in
Ferrari v. American Home Products Corp.62 In its analysis, the Court
of Appeals relied heavily upon a case recently decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC.63 Bates examined
federal preemption of state tort law claims under a different federal
act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
59. E.g., Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 810 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (noting the
legislative history suggests that Congress clearly intended to bar all design defect claims). See generally
H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367 (explaining that it
would be very difficult for a jury, upon seeing a child who has been injured by a vaccine, to find in favor
of the manufacturer, even if the vaccine had been made as safely as anyone could reasonably have
expected).
60. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367.
61. See Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650 S.E.2d 585, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("Only a
handful of courts have addressed the scope of the preemption clause found in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22, and
each has concluded, after examining the legislative history of the Vaccine Act, that the issue of whether
side effects are 'unavoidable' cannot be litigated in civil actions.").
62. 650 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
63. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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(FIFRA). 64 The portion of FIFRA at issue in Bates was declared
clear, unambiguous, and susceptible to only one plausible meaning.
65
However, the Court noted that when a statute is ambiguous, courts
have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption. 66 The
Georgia Court of Appeals opined that Bates changed traditional
preemption analysis, thus drastically altering the viability of vaccine
design defect claims in state tort proceedings. 67 The Court of Appeals
determined that (1) there is no longer a rebuttable presumption
against preemption, but a duty to accept the reading of an express
preemption statute that disfavors preemption;68 and (2) preemption
analysis ends with an examination of the statutory language alone and
no consultation of legislative history.69 Because the Vaccine Act is
susceptible to two plausible readings, courts have a duty to accept the
reading that disfavors preemption-despite any legislative intent
indicating the contrary.70 Thus, under this analysis, plaintiffs' design
defect claims against vaccine manufacturers are not preempted by the
Vaccine Act.
7 1
64. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
65. Bates, 544 U.S. at 448-49 (noting there was no plausible alternative interpretation of the statute
at issue, thus implying the statute was unambiguous).
66. Id. at 449 ("Even if Dow had offered us a plausible alternative reading of § 136v(b)-indeed,
even if its alternative were just as plausible as our reading of that text-we would nevertheless have a
duty to accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.... In areas of traditional state regulation, we
assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention
'clear and manifest."' (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995))).
67. Ferrari, 650 S.E.2d at 589.
68. In other words, if a statute is ambiguous in any way, the court must apply the interpretation that
disfavors preemption and allows state law causes of action to proceed. Id.
69. Legislative history, as well as any other relevant extrinsic materials, cannot be consulted under
the court of appeals interpretation of Bates. Id.
70. The court of appeals recognized the novelty of the decision it fashioned:
While this result differs from that reached by other courts addressing the preemptive
effect of the Vaccine Act, none of those courts addressed the impact of Bates on the
analysis of ambiguous express preemption clauses. We recognize that this result is
anomalous given the clear legislative history to the contrary, but we are constrained to
follow the Supreme Court's explicit guidance in Bates.
Id. at 590.
71. According to the court of appeals, because two plausible, alternative readings of the Vaccine Act
exist, and one of these readings disfavors federal preemption of state law tort claims, there is a duty to
accept this interpretation, and thereby allow design defect claims to proceed in state courts. Id.
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In October of 2008, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals decision in a unanimous opinion. 72 The reasoning relied
on by the Georgia Supreme Court, however, was quite different than
that employed by the Court of Appeals. First, the Georgia Supreme
Court determined that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Bates precludes the use of legislative history in preemption
analysis.73 Rather than drastically altering the traditional preemption
analysis, as the Court of Appeals advocated, Bates instead offered a
strong affirmation of the presumption against preemption in products
liability cases, and demonstrated that this presumption applies except
in the narrowest of circumstances.
74
The Georgia Supreme Court then proceeded with a far-reaching
examination of both the specific language of the Vaccine Act and its
legislative history.75 The court examined comment k to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and determined that the
majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the comment have done so
on a case-by-case basis, electing not to grant blanket immunity to
product manufacturers. 76 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court
interpreted the legislative reports behind the Vaccine Act's passage to
leave open the possibility of design defect suits, refuting the claims of
other courts that there is clear legislative history to the contrary.
77
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision allows plaintiffs, including
the Ferraris, to bring design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers with juries deciding, on a case-by-case basis, whether
a particular side effect was unavoidable or if a safer alternative
design existed for the vaccine. 78
72. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 234 (Ga. 2008).
73. Id. at 238-39 ("[T]he Court of Appeals took 'one part of the Bates ruling out of its context, and
[gave] it broader scope than is appropriate."' (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 444
(E.D. Pa. 2007))).
74. Id. at 239.
75. Id. at 238-43.
76. Id. at 239 (concluding most states that adopted comment k, including Georgia, did so in a limited
manner).
77. Id. at 243-44 (citing cases that admit it is possible Congress left open the possibility of design
defect claims for vaccines covered by the Act).
78. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 243.
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B. The Importance of Defining the Scope of Federal Preemption
Under the Vaccine Act
This Note focuses on the extent to which federal law, and the
Vaccine Act specifically, preempts a state law tort claim against a
vaccine manufacturer for design defects, and whether the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision in Ferrari correctly determined that
Congress did not intend to preempt all design defect claims against
vaccine manufacturers with the passage of the Vaccine Act. The
resolution of this question has significant ramifications for vaccine
manufacturers, potential tort plaintiffs, and the American public as a
whole. 79 An interpretation of the Vaccine Act that opens up vaccine
manufacturers to potential liability for design defects will likely lead
to an increase in litigation, and a return to the days when both
plaintiffs and defendants faced uncertain and unpredictable results in
the traditional tort system. Furthermore, the specter of large and
uncertain liability could once again result in significant price
increases for vaccines-or even worse, the complete unavailability of
some vaccines.
II. ANALYZING THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF § 300AA-22(B)(1)
Only a handful of courts have examined whether the Vaccine Act
preempts all claims that a vaccine was defectively designed.8 ° With
the exception of the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia
79. Elizabeth A. Yi, Editorial, Vaccine Lawsuit Hazards, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), June 8,2008, at B5.
80. At the time the Georgia Supreme Court opinion was issued, two federal District Courts and two
states other than Georgia had examined the question in published opinions. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania first explored the question in Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline in
March of 2007, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007), and again in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc. in August
of 2007. 508 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas examined the issue in Blackmon v. American Home Products Corp. in 2004. 328 F. Supp. 2d
659 (S.D. Tex. 2004). In 2003, a New York state trial court explored vaccine design defect preemption
in Militrano v. Lederle Laboratories. 769 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). Most recently, the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas tackled the issue in 2008 in Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No.
3861, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXIS 221 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 27, 2008). Following the Georgia
Supreme Court's Ferrari opinion, the Third Circuit examined the issue and upheld the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' design defect claims in Bruesewitz. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 251
(3d Cir. 2009).
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Supreme Court, every court that has examined the question held that
all design defects claims are preempted by the Vaccine Act.8 Like
each of the courts that previously analyzed the issue, however, the
Georgia Supreme Court employed a traditional preemption analysis
approved by the United States Supreme Court. 82 The court's analysis
began with an extensive examination of the preemptive text of the
Vaccine Act, found in § 300aa-22(b), which is based directly on
comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.83
The analysis then proceeded with an examination of the legislative
history associated with the Vaccine Act's passage to decipher
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute.
84
A. Defining Traditional Preemption Analysis
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
state laws that are in opposition to or interfere with federal laws on a
particular subject are unenforceable, and thus preempted by and
secondary to federal law. 85 The defendant vaccine manufacturers
argue that the Vaccine Act expressly preempts design defect claims
by plaintiffs.86 Express preemption exists when Congress expressly
states in a statute that state law is preempted by federal law.87 It is
clear from the language of § 300aa-22(b) that Congress intended to
81. See Bruesewitz, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 446; Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 303; Blackmon, 328 F. Supp.
2d at 666; Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 845-46; Wright, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXIS 221, at *33; see
also Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 251 (rendering decision following the opinions from the Georgia appellate
courts). But see Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 243; Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650 S.E.2d 585, 590 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007).
82. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 238.
83. Id. at 239-43.
84. Id at 240-43.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86. See Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 237 ("[T]he Vaccine Act bars [Appellees'] design defect claims
because 'any vaccine-related injury would be deemed "unavoidable" if the vaccine was properly
prepared and accompanied by proper warnings."' (quoting Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650
S.E.2d 585, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007))).
87. There are three basic instances where preemption occurs: (I) Congress expressly preempts state
law, known as "express preemption"; (2) Congress implements a pervasive federal regulatory scheme
and Congress's intent to preempt state law is inferred from the extensive nature of the scheme, known as
"field preemption"; and (3) state law conflicts with federal law such that it is either impossible to
comply with both federal and state law or it would be futile to do so, known as "conflict preemption."
Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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expressly preempt traditional state tort remedies with the passage of
the Vaccine Act.88 However, the extent of the scope of the intended
preemption under § 300aa-22(b) is unclear from the Vaccine Act, and
thus requires interpretation by reviewing courts.
89
The U.S. Supreme Court has previously specified the traditional
analysis that occurs when attempting to "identify the domain
expressly preempted" by federal statutory language. 90 Analysis of the
scope of the preemption always begins with an examination of the
text of the statute at issue.91 The interpretation of the statutory text "is
informed by two presumptions about the nature of preemption."
92
First, it must be presumed that Congress does not nonchalantly
preempt state law causes of action, especially in areas traditionally
relegated to the states.93 As the Supreme Court explains, "[The
analysis] start[s] 'with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 94 Second, the
purpose of Congress is paramount in understanding the scope of any
preemption statute.95 The intent of Congress is primarily ascertained
from the language of the statute itself and the "statutory framework"
surrounding it.9
6
88. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) (2006) ("Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this
section State law shall apply to a civil action brought for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death.")
(emphasis added).
89. See Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 238; see also Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
90. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 502, 517 (1992).
91. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 468, 484 (1996) (explaining that any analysis of the scope of
preemption must begin with the text at issue).
92. Id. at 485.
93. Id. (noting there is a "presumption against pre-emption of state police power regulations").
94. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
95. Id. at 485-86.
96. Id. at 486 ("Also relevant.., is the 'structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,' as revealed
not only in the text, but through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which
Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and
the law." (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992))).
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B. Applying the Traditional Preemption Analysis to § 300aa-22(b)(1)
1. Textual Analysis. The Importance of Comment k
Any consideration of the scope of preemption in the Vaccine Act
must begin with an examination of the text of the preemptive
statutory language itself.97 The preemptive language at issue occurs
in § 300aa-22(b)(1), which states "[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be
liable in a civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related
injury or death... if the injury or death resulted from side effects that
were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and
was accompanied by proper directions and warnings." 98 Congress
modeled § 300aa-22(b)(1) after comment k to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.99 Therefore, any examination of the
text of § 300aa-22(b)(1) necessarily must also explore comment k.'00
Section 402A provides for strict liability in product liability cases,
and comment k addresses products deemed "unavoidably unsafe."'01
Comment k recognizes there are some products that are incapable of
being made completely safe for their intended use because it is
beyond the present state of technology or human knowledge to do
so. 102 However, these unavoidably unsafe products are often quite
97. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(l) (2006).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
100. Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
101. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236,239 (Ga. 2008).
102. The full text of comment k states the following:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under
the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical
experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding
a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification
[Vol. 26:2
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useful. 10 3 The comment uses the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies as an example. 104 Despite the inherent risks in the vaccine, the
disease itself invariably leads to death. 10 5 Thus, it is preferable to
accept the risks inherent in the vaccine rather than the risks
associated with rabies. 
0 6
Comment k explicitly distinguishes the three basic types of product
liability claims: design defect, manufacturing defect, and packaging
or marketing defect. 10 7  Comment k effectively posits that an
unavoidably unsafe product, such as a vaccine, is not defectively
designed if it is properly manufactured and accompanied by adequate
warnings and directions. 1
°8
Unfortunately, comment k-like § 300aa-22(b)(1)-is susceptible
to ambiguous interpretation. One possibility is that a case-by-case
analysis is necessary to determine whether a particular product is
unavoidably unsafe, and that it could have been made safer by an
alternative design. 1°9 A second possibility is that all products falling
within a particular category, such as vaccines, are considered
unavoidably unsafe, and thus strict liability for design defects is
completely barred. 110 At the time the Vaccine Act was adopted,
incorporating comment k into § 300aa-22(b)(1), the case law was
divided as to which analysis was the appropriate one to apply. 11
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
103. Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Neb. 2000).
104. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (recognizing
the three basic types of product liability claims: (1) design defect, (2) manufacturing defect, and (3)
inadequate labeling or a failure to warn).
108. Id.
109. Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
110. Id. at 845.
111. Id. at 844 (noting that at the time the Vaccine Act was adopted, courts had yet to reach a
consensus on the meaning of comment k or its application in design defect litigation); see also Freeman
v. Hoffran-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Neb. 2000) (noting that comment k has been
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a. Jurisdictions Favoring "Blanket Immunity" Under Comment k
Some jurisdictions reject a case-by-case determination of whether
certain side effects are unavoidable, instead holding that any
prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe by definition, thereby barring
strict liability claims for design defects.1 12 These jurisdictions argue
that unavoidably unsafe products, as contemplated by comment k, are
not defectively designed as a matter of law and grant "blanket
immunity" to their manufacturers. 113 These courts generally justify an
exception from strict liability by focusing on the product's value to
society. 114
b. Jurisdictions Favoring a Limited Application of Comment k
Other jurisdictions, however, conclude that a case-by-case analysis
is appropriate to determine whether a prescription drug is
unavoidably unsafe. 115 These courts believe society's interest in
marketing and developing prescription drugs is adequately protected
without resorting to blanket immunity for drug manufacturers. 116
Thus, the trier of fact is responsible for determining whether, on a
case-by-case basis, a particular product is unavoidably unsafe." 7
Most jurisdictions following the case-by-case approach use a risk-
utility balancing analysis to determine whether the benefits of a
product outweigh its known risks." 8 As part of this analysis, the trier
of fact must consider whether there was any reasonable alternative
interpreted in a variety of ways and that there is wide-scale disagreement among the courts concerning
its application).
112. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477, 480 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991).
113. Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 836.
114. Brown, 751 P.2d at 480.
115. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 239 (Ga. 2008).
116. Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 836 (noting that providing blanket immunity from strict liability under
comment k is widely criticized).
117. Id.
118. Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he benefits of
the product must outweigh its known risks on the date the product is distributed before the manufacturer
can avoid strict liability.").
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design that would have accomplished the product's purpose with less
risk to the consumer.119
c. The Georgia Supreme Court's Textual Interpretation of
§ 300aa-22(b)(1) in Light of Comment k
In Ferrari, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that § 300aa-
22(b) does not preempt all design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers. The court began its analysis with a textual
interpretation of comment k. In examining comment k, the Georgia
Supreme Court first acknowledged the two conflicting interpretations
of comment k, and determined there is much disagreement regarding
its application. 120 The court then noted that most of the states that
have adopted comment k have done so on the case-by-case basis.
121
The court further explained that other courts examining comment k in
the context of design defect litigation under the Vaccine Act
erroneously construed the comment to support an interpretation of
§ 300aa-22(b)(1) as rejecting the case-by-case analysis. 122 For
example, one court held that a rejection of the case-by-case
determination of whether a certain side effect was unavoidable
"mirrors this established area of tort law for unavoidably unsafe
products."' 123 The Georgia Supreme Court pointed out that this was an
erroneous interpretation because the law surrounding comment k was
far from established and agreed upon-and in fact, the majority of
jurisdictions favor the more limited, case-by-case approach. 124
After explaining where previous courts had erred in their
interpretation of comment k, the Georgia Supreme Court proceeded
with a thorough analysis of the text of § 300aa-22(b)(1) in light of the
119. Id.
120. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 239.
121. Id.
122. Id. (stating both Sykes and Blackmon erred in their construction of comment k and used this
erroneous construction to support their interpretations of the Vaccine Act).
123. Id. (arguing that Sykes, in particular, erred in its interpretation).
124. Id. at 239-40 (commenting that Bruesewitz also acknowledged the Sykes court's
misunderstanding of comment k).
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correct interpretation of comment k. 125 The Court explained that the
conditional nature of § 300aa-22(b)(1) contemplates situations in
which side effects will occur that are avoidable, and for which the
manufacturer may be liable. 126 For example, § 300aa-22(b)(1)
insulates a manufacturer from civil liability if the vaccine-related
injury or death "resulted from side effects that were unavoidable."'' 27
It certainly was within Congress's power to omit this clause, and
instead make immunity to civil litigation conditional on proper
preparation and adequate warnings only. 128 This is not how Congress
chose to construct the statute, however. Instead, Congress composed
the statute to bar liability for side effects that are "unavoidable by
means other than proper manufacturing and packaging."'129 This
means if a particular side effect could have been avoided by
employing a feasible alternative design, liability is not completely
barred. 1
30
2. Legislative History Analysis
Following its extensive analysis of the text of § 300aa-22(b)(1), the
Georgia Supreme Court then examined the legislative history behind
the Vaccine Act to ensure that its interpretation aligned with
congressional intent.' 31 Although previous courts reasoned the
legislative history of the Vaccine Act strongly favors preemption of
all design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers, the Georgia
Supreme Court disagreed. 1
32
125. Id. ("An analysis of the language and intent of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(i), unhindered by the
mistakes of Blackmon and Sykes, shows that Congress not only adopted comment k, but understood that
comment in the same way that Bruesewitz and the great majority of other courts came to understand
it.").
126. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 240.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006).
128. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 240.
129. Id.
130. Id. ("[T]he last clause of subsection (b)(1) was necessary to ensure that its bar to liability would
not apply to the manufacturing and packaging process, but only to side effects which were not avoidable
by a safer design.").
131. Id. at240-42.
132. See, e.g., id. at 240 (refuting the Georgia Court of Appeals assertion that there is "clear
legislative history" supporting a statutory construction that bars all design defect claims).
[Vol. 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 636 2009-2010
636   I IT    ( l. :  
ti   t 125  
 (b)(1) l t s  
,  
  - (b)(1) 
r t   l ted 
lt  fr  side effects that were unavoidable.,,127 
'    
it   l r 
ti   ly.128  
,   
le  
  ing.,,129  
 l r   
 ti   l  
. 130 
.    
  ( )( ),  
   
 ti    
l  131   
    
, i  
rt disagreed. 132 
. I . (  l i      s  ( )(I),  
i t  f l   ,  t t r  t l  t  t ,    
t i  t    t t it   t       
. rrari,  . .  t . 
.  . . .  - 2(b)(I) . 
. rari,  
. . 
. Id.  l t l   ti   1)      
t l  t  t  t i   ,  
  
. .   
. , . ., .     
l i l ti  i t ry" ti   t t t      t  
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/6
20101 NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION ACT 637
The jurisdictions declaring the legislative history behind the
Vaccine Act favors a blanket preemption analysis rely on the
following sentence: "Accordingly, if [vaccine-injured persons]
cannot demonstrate under applicable law either that a vaccine was
improperly prepared or that it was accompanied by improper
directions or inadequate warnings [they] should pursue recompense
in the compensation system, not the tort system."' 133 These courts
argue that this passage clearly demonstrates Congress's intent to
relegate defective design claims to the compensation system
established in the Vaccine Act, rather than the traditional tort
system. 134 However, the Georgia Supreme Court points out that the
Committee did not state the Vaccine Act compensation system was
mandatory. 135 Rather, the system should be viewed as an alternative
to the traditional tort system.' 36 Viewing this particular passage in
light of the alternative nature of the compensation system, the
Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Committee meant only that "if
a vaccine-injured person does not have a claim for a manufacturing
or warning defect, he should find the compensation system appealing
even though he is authorized to attempt to prove the existence of a
safer design in the tort system."' 37 By no means, however, does this
passage mean that all design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers are preempted. 1
38
An additional passage from the Committee report upon which the
Georgia Supreme Court relied states the following:
133. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367.
134. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 248 (3d 2009); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 2d 430, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D. Pa.
2007); Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664-65 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (stating this
passage "indicates rather clearly the Committee's intent to relegate design defect claims to the
compensation system"); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003);
Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 3861, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. P1. LEXIS 221, at *31-32 (Phila. Ct.
Com. P1. Aug. 27, 2008).
135. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 242-43 (noting the legislative history does not indicate that use of the
alternative compensation system is required).
136. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367 (stating potential
tort plaintiffs "now have an appealing alternative to the tort system").
137. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 241.
138. Id.
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The Committee has set forth Comment [k] in this bill
because it intends that the principle in Comment [k]
regarding "unavoidably unsafe" products, i.e. those
products which in the present state of human skill and
knowledge cannot be made safe, apply to the vaccines
covered in the bill and that such products not be the subject
of liability in the tort system.' 
39
Ironically, other courts rely on this exact passage to support the
position that the Vaccine Act does preempt all defective design
claims. 14  This passage appears to be susceptible to two different
interpretations. 14 1 On the one hand, it clearly adopts comment k.
14 2
Such an adoption is subject to an interpretation that the majority view
of comment k applies, meaning vaccines should be examined on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are unavoidably
unsafe. 143  This is the interpretation advocated by the Georgia
Supreme Court.144 On the other hand, the passage clearly exempts
vaccines from tort liability if they are deemed "unavoidably
unsafe."' 145  As this passage demonstrates, so much of the
interpretation of the legislative history behind the Vaccine Act is
139. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26, as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367.
140. See Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Blackmon v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664-65 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769
N.Y.S.2d 839, 845-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
141. The interpretation advocated by the Georgia Supreme Court argues that this passage "bolsters" a
construction of the Vaccine Act that does not preempt all design defect claims. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at
242. On the other hand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas claims the
passage suggests Congress intended that the Vaccine Act absorb all design defect claims. Blackmaon, 328
F. Supp. 2d at 664-65.
142. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367.
143. See Militrano, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (arguing Congress is presumed to have known of the debate
surrounding comment k when it was adopted in the Vaccine Act).
144. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 242. But see Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 810 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2006) ("While the initial language in the House Committee Report with respect to Comment k
... appears to leave open the possibility of a design defect claim with respect to vaccines covered by the
Vaccine Act, the balance of the House Committee's discussion of the issue clearly establishes
Congress'[s] determination that the Comment k defense bars all such claims .... ").
145. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 26, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,6367.
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dependent upon which explanation of comment k is accepted, and the
Committee report does not clearly identify which it preferred. 1
46
In addition to exploring the 1986 Committee report on the Vaccine
Act to decipher congressional intent, the Georgia Supreme Court also
examined subsequent legislative history in an attempt to glean
additional evidence of the purpose behind the Act. 147 Recognizing
that the exact same committee that originally considered the Vaccine
Act and produced the 1986 report also produced a subsequent report
in 1987, the Georgia Supreme Court examined this report "to 'shed[ ]
light on allegedly ambiguous language'" in the Vaccine Act. 148 The
1987 report states unequivocally that "the codification of Comment
(k) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not intended to decide
as a matter of law the circumstances in which a vaccine should be
deemed unavoidably unsafe.' 49 Instead, such determinations should
be left to courts, to be made in accordance with "applicable law."'
' 50
This statement appears to support the Georgia Supreme Court's
assertion that § 300aa-22(b)(1) does not bar all design defect claims
as a matter of law.151
Additionally, the Georgia Supreme Court pointed to a rejected
amendment to the Vaccine Act that was discussed in the 1987
Committee report to further support its interpretation that Congress
did not intend to impose an automatic bar on design defect claims.
152
The Court noted that an amendment that would have stated that
"failure to develop [a] safer vaccine was not grounds for liability was
rejected by the Committee during its original consideration of the
146. Id. (stating the Committee intended that the principle in comment k regarding unavoidably
unsafe products apply to vaccines, but neglecting to mention which of the two competing interpretations
of comment k should apply).
147. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 241.
148. Id. (quoting Grapevine Imps. v. United States, 71 Fed. CI. 324, 335 (2006)).
149. Id. (referencing H.R. REP. No. 100-391(), at 691 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-1, 2313-365).
150. Id.
151. The statement referenced by the Georgia Supreme Court appears to expressly reserve a position
for the courts in determining whether vaccines are unavoidably unsafe. Such a statement would support
the Georgia Supreme Court's theory that all design defect claims are not preempted by federal law. Id.
152. Id.
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[Vaccine] Act."' 53 From the rejection of this proposed amendment,
the Court infers that Congress did not intend "to include the
provisions embodied in the rejected amendment."'154 Thus, Congress
did not intend to grant blanket immunity to manufacturers for design
defects. 155 This is a plausible interpretation of the meaning of the
rejected amendment. However, another plausible interpretation is that
Congress did not want to hold manufacturers accountable for failing
to find safer alternatives to their products as currently designed, not
necessarily that they are liable for design defect claims.
After extensively examining the text of § 300aa-22(b)(1), and
attempting to determine the congressional intent behind this statutory
provision from the relevant legislative history, the Georgia Supreme
Court held the Vaccine Act "clearly does not preempt all design
defect claims against vaccine manufacturers, but rather provides that
such a manufacturer cannot be held liable for defective design if it is
determined, on a case-by-case basis, that the particular vaccine was
unavoidably unsafe.' ' 156 Granting such widespread immunity "would
'have the perverse effect of granting complete [tort] immunity from
design defect liability to an entire industry." ' 157 This conclusion is
supported by the legislative history behind the Vaccine Act.
Unfortunately, an opposite conclusion can also be garnered from the
legislative history behind the Act.158 These contradictory conclusions
are the result of Congress's reliance on comment k in fashioning the
preemptive language of § 300aa-22(b)(1). Because comment k itself
is susceptible to differing interpretations, and Congress does not
expressly state which interpretation it favored, it is unlikely the
153. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(f), at 691, as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-365).
154. Id. (quoting NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48:18 (7th ed. 2008)).
155. Id. at242.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 243 (quoting Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaf, 481 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga.
1997)).
158. Courts other than the Georgia Supreme Court have examined the legislative history behind the
Vaccine Act and have reached a different conclusion. E.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d
430, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D. Pa. 2007);
Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Militrano v. Lederle
Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
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debate on the scope of the Vaccine Act's preemption of design defect
claims will end without intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court.'
59
III. PROPOSAL: GRANTING "EXCEPTIONAL PRODUCT" STATUS TO
NECESSARY CHILDHOOD VACCINES
The decision in American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari has
upset the uniformity of vaccine design defect litigation in the United
States, and requires resolution to ensure that the Vaccine Act is
applied fairly and consistently throughout the states. To ensure
vaccine manufacturers are not subject to differing standards in
various states, vaccines should be deemed "exceptional products" of
great social significance, and granted limited immunity from design
defect suits. Such a designation is compatible with Congress's
purposes in enacting the Vaccine Act and would help protect the
nation's supply of childhood vaccines.
A. The Ramifications of Ferrari-A Loss of Uniformity
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in American Home
Products Corp. v. Ferrari threatens to have far reaching ramifications
for vaccine manufacturers, potential tort plaintiffs suffering vaccine-
related injuries, and the American public as a whole. 160 Since the
enactment of the Vaccine Act, vaccine manufacturers have remained
relatively sheltered from design defect litigation. 161 The Georgia
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Vaccine Act has renewed the
159. The Georgia Supreme Court appears to suggest this at the close of its opinion, stating that "we
must reject such a far-reaching interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (b)(1), at least until the Supreme
Court of the United States has spoken on the issue." Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 243.
160. Yi, supra note 79 ("If even one state ... opens its courts to civil suits against vaccine
manufacturers, [the] carefully crafted federal system [established by the Vaccine Act] would be
disrupted.").
161. See Sloan et al., supra note 9, at 2444 (explaining that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986 protected vaccine manufacturers from litigation until relatively recently); see also Paul
Howard, On Vaccines, Immune to Reason, WASH. POST, THINK TANK TowN, Oct. 12, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2007/10/1 1/AR2007101 101597.html.
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industry's concerns about liability. 162  An increase in vaccine
litigation will likely result in a repeat of the conditions that led
Congress to adopt the Vaccine Act in the first place-more
manufacturers may elect to leave the market, resulting in higher
prices and shortages of necessary and critical vaccines.
163
The fear of vaccine shortages is well founded. With only five
companies producing all of the routine vaccines for the Unites States,
the country has experienced shortages several times in recent
years. 164 The profit margin on vaccine development and production is
relatively low. 165 Manufacturers cannot justify production of vaccines
if they fail to bring in profits. 166 The increase in litigation that will
likely result from the Ferrari decision will inflate operating costs for
manufacturers, further decreasing profit margins.
As the Georgia Supreme Court itself contemplated, it is highly
likely the United States Supreme Court will be required to determine
the scope of the preemptive language in § 300aa-22(b). 167 With the
enactment of the Vaccine Act, Congress created a single statutory
framework, applicable nationwide.168 As the litigation landscape now
stands, the Georgia Supreme Court's decision upsets the uniformity
162. Associated Press, Couple Can Sue Vaccine Company, Court Says: Lawsuit Claims Mercury
Preservative in Shot Responsible for Child's Autism, MSNBC.CoM, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27065692/ [hereinafter Couple Can Sue].
163. See Sloan et al., supra note 9, at 2444 (noting that a surge of lawsuits in the 1980s led to
concerns about the supply of childhood vaccines, and the recent surge in thimerosal litigation has
renewed the industry's concerns about liability).
164. See id. at 2443 (noting that in 2001-2002, the United States experienced shortages in the supply
of eight of the eleven recommended childhood vaccines); see also Arthur E. Foulkes & Nicolas Heidon,
Vaccine Shortage Leads to the FDA's Doorstep, INVESTOR'S BuS. DAILY, Oct. 22, 2004, available at
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1374 (explaining that severe vaccine shortages
from 2000 to 2003 forced forty-nine states to implement rationing for common, yet critical, vaccines).
165. For an overview of the many factors that contribute to the low financial returns on vaccine
development and production, see Sloan et al., supra note 9, at 2443-44. The article outlines the costly
process associated with developing a new vaccine, describes the stringent FDA regulations relating to
production, and explains how litigation expenses contribute to make vaccines high-risk, low return
investments for manufacturers. Id.
166. See id. at 2444.
167. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 243 (Ga. 2008).
168. Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (.'Congress [did not]
leave vaccine design standards open to reexamination under the laws of each state, with the potential for
interstate conflict: the Vaccine Act sets one rule, applicable nationwide .... "' (quoting Ferrari v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., No. 02-VS-031404-F, slip op. at 10 (State Ct. of Fulton County, Ga., Nov. 30,
2005))).
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of how the Vaccine Act has previously been interpreted in federal
and state courts. 169  Such interstate conflict exposes vaccine
manufacturers to potentially inconsistent tort regimes. 1
70
The opinions of both the Georgia Supreme Court and the federal
and state courts that have previously ruled on the preemptive effect of
the Vaccine Act are well reasoned and point to ample legislative
history to support their decisions-and yet they come to opposite
conclusions. This divergence is due to the two conflicting
interpretations of § 300aa-22(b) of the Vaccine Act: the interpretation
favored by the Georgia Supreme Court requires a determination, on a
case-by-case basis, of whether the adverse side effects from a
particular vaccine are unavoidable,171 and the interpretation advanced
by other state and federal courts posits that vaccine injuries are
unavoidable and subject to preemption so long as the vaccine was
properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and
warnings. 172 As has been demonstrated, these differing interpretations
are the result of the disagreement regarding the application of
comment k, which was expressly adopted by § 300aa-22(b). 17 3 Thus,
any resolution of whether the Vaccine Act preempts design defect
claims must not only look to Congress's primary objectives in
enacting the Vaccine Act-to ensure the stability of the childhood
vaccine market, while also compensating the claims of vaccine-
injured children in a predictable manner-but also to the underlying
meaning of comment k.
169. Couple Can Sue, supra note 162.
170. See Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Apr. 7, 2009) (No. 08-1120) ("Absent federal
preemption against the possibility of state tort claims, pharmaceutical companies operating nationwide
are subject to differing legal standards because courts throughout the fifty states may answer the same
liability questions differently....").
171. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 242.
172. Id. at239.
173. Id. at 239-40; see also Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844-45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003).
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B. The "Exceptional Products " Doctrine
The Eighth Circuit has put forth a persuasive analysis of comment
k's application in products liability cases that may, at least in part,
resolve the dilemma.' 74 The court's analysis first notes that the policy
behind comment k acknowledges that some unreasonably dangerous
products benefit society to such an extent that placing the risk of
injury on the consumer, rather than the manufacturer, is justified, so
long as the product is properly manufactured and accompanied by
adequate warnings.' 75 However, the court goes on to explain that the
language of comment k suggests that only "exceptional products"
should be exempt from strict liability. 176 Specifically, comment k
uses the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies as an example to
imply that only products with exceptional social need fall within the
comment's exception. 177 The Eight Circuit concludes its theory by
surmising that the "unavoidably unsafe exception should apply only
upon a showing of exceptional social need.'
178
C. Applying the "Exceptional Products " Doctrine to Vaccines
Such an application of comment k could easily be applied to
vaccines, and doing so would ensure that the two ultimate goals of
Congress in enacting § 300aa-22(b) of the Vaccine Act are still met.
It is undisputed that vaccines can cause severe side effects in some
individuals. 179 Yet vaccines are also enormously important to the
174. LITIGATING TORT CASES § 60:27 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2008).
175. Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1989). Note that comment k itself only
addresses liability premised on a theory of strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. k (1965). Courts, however, have unanimously agreed that Congress's adoption of the comment in
§ 300aa-22(b) is applicable to liability premised on both strict liability and negligence. See, e.g., Sykes
v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
176. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1069.
177. Id. ("[T]he example given-the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies-suggests that only
special products, those with exceptional social need, fall within the gamut of comment k.").
178. The Court then added that a showing of exceptional social need "should be determined on a case-
by-case basis." Id. The solution proposed in this paper, however, suggests that a showing of exceptional
social need does not have to be determined on a case-by-case basis in the courts, but can also be
determined via congressional action, such as the Vaccine Act.
179. H.R. REP, No. 99-908, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346-47.
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well-being of society as a whole.' Just as comment k recognizes the
need for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, despite its potential for lethal
side effects, "The Vaccine Act reflects a congressional determination
that the disappearance or unavailability of childhood vaccines would
cause far greater harm than the inevitable but limited injuries caused
by the vaccines themselves." 181 Given the exceptional need of society
for the availability of affordable childhood vaccines, it would be
reasonable to apply the "unavoidably unsafe" exception to the routine
childhood vaccines covered in the Vaccine Act and deem these
particular vaccines "exceptional products" that are shielded from
design defect suits by statute. 182 Furthermore, the scope of the
exemption from litigation could be limited to only those side effects
recognized in the Vaccine Act's "Vaccine Injury Table," thereby
ensuring that manufacturers only receive immunity from suit in
instances where Congress has determined there is an important social
need.
This application of comment k to § 300aa-22(b) of the Vaccine Act
is consistent with Congress's ultimate concerns in enacting the
comprehensive statute. It is reasonable to infer Congress intended an
interpretation of the Vaccine Act that protects manufacturers from
design defect suits because doing so would encourage more
manufacturers to remain in the market. 183 As one court noted,
[T]he Vaccine Act's purpose of protecting vaccine
manufacturers from the unpredictability and expense of the tort
system would be thwarted by allowing juries to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether a vaccine was unavoidably unsafe because
"[t]he manufacturers would again be subjected to the
180. Id at 5-6, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,6345-46.
181. Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
182. For example, in Hill v. Searle Laboratories, the product at issue was an intrauterine
contraceptive device (an IWD). 884 F.2d 1064, 1065 (8th Cit. 1989). The court determined the product
did not qualify as an "exceptional product" because alternative methods of birth control were available
and there was no showing that IUDs in general were exceptionally beneficial to society. Id. at 1069-70.
Congress has determined, on the other hand, that vaccines are vitally important to America's public
health. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 5, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346.
183. See Blackmon, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 302
(E.D. Pa. 2007).
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 645 2009-2010
0)    TI  S 
i  t   180 t i   
 l  
  l i ti n 
e il ility     
 l     
 selves.,,181 l  
   
le l   i   
   
l r i s ti al   
 r ,   
  
  i  ,   
 r    
   
 
ti   )   
t 's    
i e  l    
i    rs  
  
  183   
  '    
     
 i  
  l   
    
. I . t -6,  rinted i   . . . . . . . 
. l  . .  r . r .,  . .  ,  . . . . 
.  l , l .  tories,  
 U r   
l m   
 t r    i  t t  i  l  ti ll    . . t . 
, '  
lt .  p. . , t ,  i ted i   . . . . . . , . 
.  l ,  . .  t ;  . l - it li e,  . .  ,  
. . . . 
29
Guffrey: Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act Reall
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
unpredictability and expense of the tort system and companies
would be dissuaded from remaining or entering the vaccine
market."'1
84
Allowing case-by-case inquiries by juries would not protect vaccine
manufacturers from expensive and unpredictable litigation.'85 Yet
Congress clearly stated this was one of the primary goals addressed
by the Vaccine Act. 186  Thus, to ensure Congress's goal of
encouraging manufacturers to enter or remain in the vaccine market
is met, the only reasonable interpretation of § 300aa-22(b) is that it
absolutely protects manufacturers from design defect claims. 187 AM
approach allowing a case-by-case inquiry "would defeat the
protection the Vaccine Act was intended to provide to the vaccine
manufacturers and, in turn, to the supply of childhood vaccines."1
88
Additionally, the classification of childhood vaccines as
"exceptional products" shielded from design defect liability for a
limited set of side effects that are deemed "unavoidable" is
compatible with Congress's second goal of ensuring reliable and
timely compensation for those injured by vaccines. In granting
manufacturers limited liability from design defect suits for
"unavoidable" side effects under § 300aa-22(b), Congress did not
eliminate compensation for vaccine-injured children. 189 Rather, the
Vaccine Act provides for compensation through an alternative to the
traditional tort system-an alternative that is designed to be
consistent, predictable, and timely. 190  Moreover, the injured
individual need not prove causation or fault, and alleged defective
184. Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., No. 3861, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 221, at *23 (Phila.
Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 27, 2008) (quoting Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02).
185. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430,445 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
186. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 6-7, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6347-48.
187. Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 301-02 ("[T]he purpose of the Vaccine Act would not be served if
defective design claims could be tried before juries.").
188. Wright, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEX1S 221, at *31.
189. Id. at *23; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006).
190. Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 297; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Jan. 29, 2010) (No. 08-1120) (noting the Court of
Federal Claims awards compensation to approximately one-third of all claimants, and that the average
award exceeds $750,000).
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design claims are compensated under this alternative no-fault
system. 191 Classifying childhood vaccines as "exceptional products"
and limiting those who suffer vaccine-related injuries to the
alternative no-fault system for design defect claims strikes a balance
between the two congressional objectives of the Vaccine Act:
compensating injured individuals and protecting vaccine
manufacturers from excessive tort liability.'
92
An application of comment k to § 300aa-22(b) of the Vaccine Act
that grants routine childhood vaccines status as legislatively-
determined "exceptional products" and limits design defect claims
against the manufacturers of these vaccines for side effects that the
Vaccine Act deems "unavoidable" is necessary to ensure the Act's
efficacy. This interpretation does not necessarily protect
manufacturers from all design defect suits, but from suits that are
premised on liability for side effects that have been deemed
"unavoidable" by the Vaccine Act. 193 If a particular vaccine is
covered by the Vaccine Act, and the alleged harmful side effect is
listed in the Vaccine Injury Table, the manufacturer would be
protected from a design defect suit. A case-by-case inquiry would be
prohibited. Alternatively, if a vaccine is not covered by the Act, or if
a vaccine is covered under the Act but the alleged harmful side effect
suffered by the plaintiff is not listed in the Vaccine Injury Table, the
plaintiff is not barred from filing a design defect suit against the
vaccine manufacturer. 194 This interpretation ensures that the federal
government's efforts to establish a uniform national standard for
childhood vaccines under the Vaccine Act are served.195 Finally, the
"exceptional products" interpretation gives credence to Congress's
191. Sykes, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
192. Wright, 2008 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 221, at *23.
193. In Ferrari, the Georgia Supreme Court specifically noted that the Vaccine Act does not
necessarily protect manufacturers from design defect suits, but rather protects them from liability for
unavoidable side effects. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008).
194. Additionally, the Vaccine Act could be revised to list side effects that scientific evidence strongly
suggests are not the result of vaccination, such as autism, and stipulate that vaccine manufacturers are
not subject to design defect claims for these particular side effects, as well.
195. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("[T]he policy of the
Vaccine Act is to protect the national vaccine supply by protecting manufacturers from the potential
inconsistencies of the 50-state tort system .... ").
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ultimate goals in enacting the Act: protection of America's supply of
childhood vaccines and compensation for the small number of
children who are invariably harmed by immunization.' 
96
CONCLUSION
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 was enacted
to protect the interests of both the American public, by preserving the
supply of necessary and critical childhood vaccines, and of vaccine-
injured individuals, by ensuing they receive adequate compensation
for their suffering.' 9 7 Congress determined that the best method of
achieving both these crucial goals was to limit potential plaintiffs'
remedies in tort claims based on state law causes of action when their
theory of recovery is based on an alleged design defect.
198
Unfortunately, the scope of the preemptive language of the Vaccine
Act, found in § 300aa-22(b), is ambiguous and subject to two
differing interpretations. 199 These differing interpretations occur
because § 300aa-22(b) is modeled after comment k to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which itself has been the
subject of disagreement among courts.2 " As a result, several courts
have concluded § 300aa-22(b) of the Vaccine Act imposes a total bar
on design defect claims arising from vaccine-related injuries. 20 1 In
American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, however, the Georgia
Supreme Court decided that the Vaccine Act only bars design defect
claims if the injuries are deemed, on a case-by-case basis,
unavoidable. 20
2
The Georgia Supreme Court's decision has led to interstate conflict
as to whether the Vaccine Act provides an absolute bar to design
defect claims under state law, and resulted in inconsistent application
196. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348.
197. See discussion supra Part I.A.1; supra note 36.
198. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
199. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
200. See discussion supra Part ll.B. 1.
201. See discussion supra Part I.A.2; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
202. See discussion supra Part I.A.3; discussion supra Part ll.B. .c; discussion supra Part H.B.2.
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of the Vaccine Act on a nationwide level.2 °3 Furthermore, Ferrari
will likely lead to an increase in vaccine design defect litigation,
increasing the costs of vaccine production for manufacturers.2 °4
Escalating litigation costs may also lead some manufacturers to leave
the vaccine manufacturing market altogether, further threatening the
nation's already fragile supply of childhood vaccines. 20 5 The Vaccine
Act sought to prevent just such a scenario by shielding manufacturers
from certain types of litigation-namely design defect claims-while
also ensuring adequate and timely compensation for vaccine-injured
individuals. 20
6
The two goals of the Vaccine Act can be properly effected by
applying an application of comment k to § 300aa-22(b) that classifies
vaccines as special products of exceptional social importance.20 7 By
granting routine childhood vaccines an "exceptional products" status,
the Supreme Court can ensure the "unavoidably unsafe" exception
applies to these vaccines and shield them from design defect suits by
208statute. Although it is unclear from the legislative history
underlying the Vaccine Act which interpretation of comment k
Congress intended to adopt when enacting § 300aa-22(b), 20 9 it is
quite clear that Congress sought to protect the supply of childhood
vaccines available to the American public by insulating vaccine
manufacturers from certain forms of tort liability.210 An interpretation
of comment k, and thus § 300aa-22(b), that recognizes the
importance of childhood vaccines by classifying them as "exceptional
products" serves Congress's intent, while still ensuring compensation
for vaccine-injured children.
In the meantime, Stefan Ferrari and his family may soon be able to
pursue their claims against the vaccine manufacturers at the trial
203. See discussion supra Part HLI.A; supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text; supra notes 168-
170 and accompanying text.
204. See discussion supra Part llI.A; supra note 164 and accompanying text.
205. See discussion supra Part 1ll.A; supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
207. See discussion supra Part 11I.B.
208. See discussion supra Part IlI.C.
209. See discussion supra Part H.B. 1; supra note 146 and accompanying text.
210. See discussion supra Part I.A.1; see also H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367.
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court level in the Georgia courts.211 They may have to wait a bit
longer, however-shortly after the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision, the vaccine manufacturers filed a petition for certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court.
212
211. See McDonald, supra note 19, at 1.
212. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Mar. 5, 2009)
(No. 08-1120). Shortly thereafter, on March 27, 2009, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth, Inc. 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009). In that decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) expressly preempts design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers. Id. at 428. Following briefing by the parties and amici curiae in Ferrari, the United
States Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United
States. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (2009) (No. 08-1120). However, before the
Solicitor General filed her brief, the Ferraris filed a supplemental brief with the Court, notifying it that
they had voluntarily dismissed the design defect claims against the petitioners without prejudice.
Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 1, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Oct. 7,
2009) (No. 08-1120). Thus, the Ferraris argued, the case was moot and the petition for certiorari should
be dismissed. Id. at 2. The petitioners quickly filed their own supplemental brief in response, urging the
Court to grant the writ of certiorari, or, in the alternative, hold the case pending resolution of Bruesewitz
(which, by this time, also had a petition for certiorari pending with the U.S. Supreme Court).
Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 6, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Oct. 20,
2009) (No. 08-1120). The petitioners argued the Ferraris' voluntary dismissal without prejudice did not
render the case moot, because Georgia law allows the Ferraris to refile their claims at any time for at
least nine more years. Id. at 2. Furthermore, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court had not been
vacated, and therefore stands as binding precedent in Georgia. Id. at 1. Finally, on January 29, 2010, the
Solicitor General filed her brief on behalf of the United States. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 129 S. Ct. 2786 (Jan. 29, 2010) (No. 08-1120). The brief
urged the Supreme Court to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in Bruesewitz, and to hold the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Ferrari pending the disposition of Bruesewitz, or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the Ferrari petition (because of the potential mootness question). Id. at I. The Solicitor General
stated the "Supreme Court of Georgia erred," and that the court's Ferrari opinion "frustrates Congress's
intent to stabilize the market for vaccines critical to children's health." Id. at 7. Because the issue
presented in Ferrari and Bruesewitz is "pressing," the Solicitor General urged the Court to review the
question presented. Id. Thus, serious ramifications from the Georgia Supreme Court's Ferrari opinion
are quite likely, unless the Supreme Court intervenes by granting certiorari in Bruesewitz or Ferrari.
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